This paper investigates the conditions under which rms are willing to invest in the general human capital of their workers. We show that a key ingredient is the presence of labor market imperfections which distort the wage structure. In particular, rms will invest in training if the gap between productivity and wages is larger for more skilled workers. We outline a number of speci c mechanisms which lead to a distorted equilibrium wage structure, and thus induce rms to invest in worker training. The predictions of our model di er from the standard Beckerian analysis of general human capital. We argue that a model with imperfect labor markets is more consistent with the empirical evidence on the nancing of general training.
Introduction
In the standard theory of human capital as developed by Gary Becker 1964 , there is a sharp distinction between general and speci c human capital. Skills which are only useful with the current employer constitute the speci c human capital whereas skills which are as useful with some other employer are general. Because the standard theory assumes that all labor market transactions take place in competitive markets, the worker will capture all the bene ts of his general human capital. Therefore, his employer will have n o incentive t o i n vest in these skills. In this paper, we develop the theory of human capital when labor markets are imperfect. We show that labor market frictions will imply that rms may be willing to invest in the general skills of their workers. In particular, if these frictions distort the structure of wages within the rm away from the competitive benchmark and to the bene t of unskilled workers, it will be pro table for the rm to provide workers with general skills.
In the standard model, workers pay for general training by accepting lower wages during the training period. In fact, as long as human capital is general, wages at any point in time should equal the marginal product of the worker. Empirical evidence seems to be at odds with these implications. Barron, Berger and Black 1997 summarize a body of research using employer surveys with information on worker productivity. They report that productivity growth associated with training exceeds wage growth by a factor of about 10, even though the rms claim that most of this training is valuable at other employers. Studies of the costs and productivity of apprentices have also typically concluded that apprentices do not pay for the full cost of training. For example, von Bardeleben, Beicht, and Feh er 1995 report sizeable net costs of apprenticeship training in large German rms, even though the content of these programs are highly regulated and apprentices are given exams by outside boards. Many temporary help agencies in the US also provide training to new employees. Because of the nature of the business this training has to be general. Since this training mostly takes place before the worker is assigned to a client rm, the costs of the training are shared between the worker, who puts in her time, and the temporary help rm, who pays for the monetary costs Krueger 1993. In the standard theory, rms may p a y all or part of the investment cost in rm-speci c human capital because these skills are not valuable to other employers and a worker who acquires more rm speci c skills will not necessarily get a commensurate increase in wages. In this regard, our model for investment in general skills is closely related to the standard speci c human capital model. We will show that labor market imperfections make general skills e ectively rm-speci c, because workers will incur a variety of costs in transferring their labor to another employer. Becker 1964 realized that this may happen when he wrote that in extreme types of monopsony ... job alternatives for trained and untrained workers are nil, and all training, no matter what its nature, would be speci c to the rm." p. 50, 3rd ed.. To highlight our main message, we focus on skills which are technologically general, so that in the absence of market frictions, they would be equally valuable in a range of employers.
It is plausible that most of the skills learned during training, particularly in formal training programs, are technologically general. From a theoretical viewpoint, it is not clear that a large part of skills can really be rm-speci c. Naturally, each rm has a di erent culture and organizational structure, thus learning to deal with these rm level`speci cities' can be thought o f a s a cquisition of rm speci c skills. If other rms are also using the same general technology and organizational practices, or interact with similar customers, the skills learned in one rm will be largely general. In fact, even if these practices and machines were not used by other rms, the ability of rms to invest in related skills would still be limited in the absence of other market frictions. To see why, suppose a rm employs a machine not used by a n y other rm and trains all of its workers to use this machine and then recoups the costs by p a ying workers below their marginal product. But then unless this new machine were unique or prohibitively expensive, another rm could also adopt it and attract the underpaid workers. Hence, in a world of no frictions whatsoever, it seems that only a very small fraction of skills can be technologically rm-speci c. 77 percent o f w orkers in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth NLSY report that most of the skills they learned in a particular training program or on-the-job training are general. In the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project Survey, which is designed to pick u p more informal methods of training as well, the same fraction is 72 percent Loewenstein and Spletzer 1997 .
In this paper, we start with a partial equilibrium model in Section 2. This model enables us to obtain fairly general conditions for rms to nd it pro table to invest in the general skills of their workers. The main idea is extremely simple: a rm will provide general training to a worker if the di erence between the output of a worker and his wage is growing in the amount o f skill he acquires. This never happens in a competitive labor market, because the worker is paid his marginal product, thus, his pay increases in line with his productivity. W e therefore consider models in which the worker can only carry his skills to another rm at some non-negligible private cost.
Another way of expressing this main but simple conclusion is that rm sponsored training is only possible if the wage structure of the rm is distorted away from the competitive w age structure. Moreover, this distortion needs to be in a particular direction: skilled-unskilled wage di erential needs to be less than what it would have been in a perfectly competitive economy. To see the main intuition of our results consider Figure 1 which draws the product of a worker, f ; as a function of his skills, . Suppose that this worker can quit his employer and work for another rm, and in the process, he incurs costs equal to . This implies that as long as the outside labor market is competitive, the worker will receive a w age w = f , at the current rm. The existing employer has no incentive t o i n vest in the worker's skills since he will make pro t equal to f ,w = irrespective of the value of . The perfectly competitive labor market can be thought as the special case f(τ)
No firm-sponsored training Firm-sponsored training Figure 1 with = 0. Suppose instead that the wage structure is distorted such that f , w = and 0 0 a s d r a wn in the gure. The rm would now make higher pro ts from workers with high . As long as the costs of increasing these skills via worker training are not too large, the rm would like t o i n vest in . This is the basic story of our paper. Why should the wage structure be distorted in this particular way? To answer this question, we endogenize outside wages in general equilibrium. In Section 3, we provide a variety of mechanisms which w ould create a market structure with distorted equilibrium wage structures. Brie y, rst, workers might expect to be held up by future employers in the case where they change jobs. High skill workers will lose more in absolute terms from hold-up though they may lose less in proportional terms. This enables the rm to make more pro ts from these workers than the unskilled, inducing it to invest in skills. A second possibility is the presence of rm-speci c skills that interact with general skills: when rm-speci c and general skills are complements, workers who have more general training will lose more by quitting their current rm. This enables the current employer to distort the wage structure, and invest in general training. Adverse selection is yet another mechanism: a w orker who quits will be viewed as a less able worker, and this will enable the rm to pay a l o wer wage than marginal product. If ability unobservable to other rms is complementary to training, the relative w age structure will be once more distorted against the skilled. Fourth, the presence of unions which may compress wage di erentials is another mechanism. In fact, given the relation between the wage structure and training, unions will have an added incentive to compress the wage structure in order to increase training. Fifth, e ciency wages may also lead to the same result. Firms have t o p a y a rent to workers in order to induce e ort, and if this rent increases less in skill than productivity, then it pushes up unskilled wages relative to the wage rate of a trained worker. Finally, labor market regulations which imply that rms cannot pay l o w skill workers below a certain oor will have the same impact if there is a pre-existing friction in the labor market.
Partial Equilibrium

The Environment
Consider the following two period model. In period 1, the worker and or its employer choose how m uch t o i n vest in the worker's general human capital, which w e denote by 2 + . There is no production in the rst period, and we denote the net wage of the worker" in this period by ! . This wage is conditioned on as the rm and the worker may agree on a rst-period compensation that is conditional on the amount of training that the worker is receiving. For example, ! 0 represents a payment from the worker to the rm. In period 2, the worker either stays with the rm and produces output and is paid a wage rate, w as a function of his skill level training , or he quits and obtains an outside wage. 1 There is no discounting and all agents are risk-neutral and have preferences de ned over the unique good of this economy.
Assume each w orker produces output y = f independent of the number and human capital of other workers. 2 f is an increasing, di erentiable and concave function. The cost of acquiring units of skill is c units of the good. We make the following assumptions on c which ensure that the optimal amount of training is positive and nite:
1. c i s e v erywhere strictly increasing, di erentiable and convex.
2. c 0 0 = c0 = 0 and lim !1 c 0 = 1.
Let us also denote the rst-best amount of training by which is given by c 0 = f 0 and from the assumptions on the cost of training, 0. 1 In most part, w will not be observed in its entirety, but wages for some training levels will be seen. However, w will always be in the background, as it determines the payo s o -the-equilibrium path." 2 This assumption is not as restrictive as it appears. For example, let of the rm be given by F H;K, where H is total human capital hired and K is physical capital. As long as F is constant returns to scale and K can be adjusted freely, the output of a worker y = f will be indepedent of the levels of H and K, because an optimizing rm will keep the ratio of human to physical capital constant.
The assumption that there are no technologically rm speci c skills is extreme, but it serves to highlight the mechanism we are interested in, and also echoes our emphasis in the introduction that, in the presence of frictions, the incentives to acquire general skills may be similar to those pertaining to speci c skills. In Section 3.3 we will discuss how technologically speci c and general skills interact.
We will consider two cases below. The rst is the credit constrained regime where the rm chooses and incurs the cost. This corresponds to the case where the worker is credit constrained. Therefore he cannot make a n y transfers to the rm for providing him with human capital, nor can he take a w age cut during training in order to compensate the rm for the expenses of training. In terms of our notation, ! 0 for all . The second case is the perfect credit markets regime where the worker is not a ected by credit constraints, so can pay for training, or share the costs of training with the rm, so ! 0 is possible.
A Firm's Decision in the Credit Constrained Regime
Suppose that the equilibrium wage structure is such that the worker will produce with the rm at all skill levels rather than quit to work for another rm. Also assume that workers cannot pay for training, so ! 0. Finally, to simplify the exposition, suppose that w is less concave than f which will be the case in all of our analysis below when we derive w i n equilibrium. Taking w a s g i v en, the training decision of the rm in the rst period will solve the following simple problem: max = f , w , c :
The rst order condition for rm sponsored training,^ , is: Given the conditions on w , this rst-order condition is su cient t o c haracterize rm's optimal training choice. It then follows that for rms to invest in the general skills of their workers, we require f 0 0 w 0 0. Suppose not.
Then, f 0 , w 0 , c 0 0 for all , and the rm will lose money. W e refer to f 0 0 w 0 0 as a distorted wage structure because wages increase by less than productivity. Moreover, the assumption that c 0 0 = 0 also implies that f 0 0 w 0 0 is su cient for rm-sponsored training. This leads to our rst result:
Proposition 1 A rm invests in the general skills of its worker if only if w 0 0 f 0 0, in other words if the equilibrium wage structure is distorted. This result is at some level trivial. It says that a rm will invest in the training of the worker if only if it makes more pro ts from a skilled worker. The reason why it is important for our analysis is that it links this intuitive condition to the wage structure.
Training in a Perfectly Competitive Labor Market
I f a w orker quits after the rst period, she receives a wage of v in the outside labor market. As a rst step, we take the outside wage structure v as given and look at the determination of the internal wage structure w . To start with suppose that the labor market is competitive. Then, workers will be paid their marginal product in the outside market, v = f , and can quit their rms to join the outside market at no cost. 3 A w orker who is paid less than what he can get in the outside market will not stay with the rm, thus:
Recall that marginal product of the worker is equal to f not f 0 because the decision is whether to supply labor with the human capital embedded in it in this rm or not.
This implies that w = v = f . Since in this case w 0 0 = f 0 0, the following result is immediate: Proposition 2 With competitive labor markets, the rm will not invest in general skills if the worker is credit constrained,^ = 0 .
In the case where the worker is credit constrained, thus cannot be made to bear the cost of training, no investment w ould take place. Although the optimal amount of training is strictly positive, the rm chooses not to invest anything in training. It is sometimes asserted that credit constraints of workers will induce rms to invest in general training but this is not true if labor markets are competitive. Our argument in the rest of the paper will be that the presence of labor market imperfections that distort the wage structure will improve this situation by inducing the rm to undertake some investment in skills.
However, before we turn to the core of our analysis, it is also useful to take a look at the main conclusion of Becker 1964. If the worker had the option to choose and was not a ected by credit constraints, then he would choose the rst-best amount of training. In other words, the worker would choose to maximize w , c . Since in the competitive equilibrium w = f , he would choose such that f 0 = c 0 which is the e cient amount of training in this economy. The existence of 0 is guaranteed by the conditions imposed on c .
Proposition 3 Becker With competitive labor markets and no credit constraints of workers, the rm worker would choose 0 which is the e cient amount of training.
Note that the cost of training may be forgone output during the process of training, or for other reasons, the costs may be borne directly by the rm. As long as contracts on training are possible, this does not a ect the result of this well-known proposition. For instance, if all the costs are directly paid by the rm, the worker takes a negative w age in the rst-period, i.e. ! = ,c . This also points to a di culty in determining who is actually nancing training in practice. Suppose we observe rms pay for training, and workers receive a w age ! = ! during training. It may still be the case that the worker is producing output equal to ! +c and is taking a wage below its marginal product to indirectly pay for training. However, recall that some of the examples discussed in the introduction cannot be explained away b y this argument. In the case of apprenticeship programs, an e ort is made to estimate the productivity of apprentices during training, and in the case of temporary help agencies, workers are not productive during their training.
Frictional Labor Markets
With frictional labor markets we h a ve v f . That is, despite that fact that is general human capital, if the worker separates from the rm, he will g e t a l o wer wage than his marginal product in the current rm. This implies that there is a surplus that the rm and the worker can share when they are together. For the exposition in this section, we adopt the Nash bargaining approach. Our results are not speci c to this setup; other methods of wage determination would lead to similar results. 4 Nash bargaining implies that w , the wage at the current rm, would be chosen to maximize: f , w , 0 1, w , v 1 where is the bargaining power of the worker in the symmetric Nash bargaining case = 1 =2 and 0 is the outside option of the rm, that is how much pro t the rm would obtain if the worker left and took alternative employment. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that 0 = 0, but this assumption does not a ect our results, as long as 0 + v f , so that staying together is more bene cial than breaking apart. In some of the general equilibrium extensions in the next section we will concentrate on the case where = 0, but for now a n y v alue of 1 is admissible. An important point to note is that the equilibrium wage rate w i s independent o f c , the cost of training. This is a feature of the temporal structure of our economy. The level of training is chosen by the rm, and then the worker and the rm bargain over the wage rate. At this point the training costs are already sunk.
The maximization of 1 gives 
Proposition 4 As long as
This is the central result of our paper. In contrast to the case of competitive labor markets, when wages are di erent from marginal products, the rm may h a ve an incentive t o i n vest in the general skills of its workers. The rst condition for this is that 1 which implies that the rm gets some of the rents. It is easy to see that if = 1 , w e h a ve a case akin to the perfectly competitive equilibrium, that is the worker gets paid his marginal product and therefore, the rm invests nothing in general human capital.
The second necessary condition, f 0 0 v 0 0; nests the key idea of our model. This condition implies that the wage structure is distorted in a particular way at the point of no training, and this encourages the rm to invest in the general skills of the worker. What is relevant to the rm is the wage it will pay w . However, this inside wage is endogenous. The Nash bargaining setup links the inside wage, w , to the outside wage, v . Recall 2 which yields, w 0 = f 0 + 1 , v 0 . Thus if f 0 v 0 , then we also have f 0 w 0 : therefore, wages increase less with skills than does productivity, so the rm makes higher pro ts from trained workers. In other words, what matters for the rm to be willing to invest in general training is that the internal wage structure, w , be distorted e.g. w 0 0 f 0 0 as we h a ve seen in proposition 1. The internal wage structure is in turn determined by the external wage structure, v . In fact, with Nash Bargaining, the internal wage structure is distorted only when the outside wage structure is too.
A k ey comparative static result is also immediately obtained. Everything else being equal, a reduction in v 0 increases investment in training. A reduction in v 0 means that the outside option of skilled workers deteriorates relative to the outside opportunities of the unskilled. This means that the rm can capture additional rents from the skilled, and is therefore more interested in making investments in the worker's skills.
While such distortions in the wage structure will generally have a n umber of allocative costs, they improve incentives in skill formation. However, the rm's investment will not generally be e cient:
Proposition 5 Necessary conditions for the rm to choose the e cient amount of investment in general skills are = 0 and v 0 = 0 .
This proposition shows that although rms will invest in the general skills of their workers under fairly weak conditions, the requirements for this to coincide with the e cient amount o f i n vestment are stringent. 5 For rm sponsored training to achieve e ciency, the rm needs to be the full residual claimant of the returns. This requires both that it has all the bargaining power and the outside option of the worker does not increase with more skills. v 0 = 0 will be the case with only speci c human capital, but it is unlikely if skills are technologically general.
This will be the case, for example, when v 0 = 0 as in the speci c human capital model. We conclude our discussion by summarizing our main ndings so far:
1. Firm sponsored training in general human capital is possible if the wage structure is distorted away from the competitive w age structure so that skill di erentials are compressed.
2. When only rms are capable of investing in general training due to severe credit constraints on workers, a more distorted wage structure will lead to more investment in general training.
3. The overall amount of training is likely to be suboptimal.
Turnover and Training
It is often argued that high turnover economies such as the US. do not generate su cient i n vestments in worker skills, and that this represents an im-portant market failure e.g. Blinder and Krueger, 1996. Indeed, crosssectional comparisons reveal that high turnover countries or industries have lower training see OECD 1993. However, this statement is di cult to interpret against the background of Becker's model of training. In Becker's model, workers pay for general training, and by de nition the return to general training is not in uenced by turnover. If, in contrast, the numbers only refer to speci c training which w e nd unlikely as most observed training is through formal training programs, there is no market failure: with higher turnover, the e cient amount o f i n vestment is less. The interpretation of these correlations change signi cantly when interpreted through the lenses of our model. To see how this works, suppose that there is a probability q that the rm and the worker will cease to be productive together at the end of the rst period say, an idiosyncratic productivity shock. In this case, the worker nds a new rm we ignore the possibility of unemployment. A high value of q corresponds to high turnover. Then, it is straightforward to check that the rst-order condition for the choice of gives: 6 0 = 1 , 1 , qf 0 , v 0 , c 0 = 0 3 And, clearly d =dq 0, higher turnover leads to less investment in general skills. Turnover is inconsequential when the worker pays for general training because he will obtain the same return irrespective of whether he leaves the current rm. In contrast, if the rm is investing in general skills, it values these skills only when the worker does not change jobs. Therefore, the higher is the likelihood that the worker will change jobs, the less willing is the rm to train the worker. With imperfect labor markets and credit constraints on workers, higher turnover implies less training and therefore lower welfare because of lost output see also Acemoglu 1997, Bishop 1996.
A Note on Welfare
A simple point to note is that in the model we h a ve presented and in the speci c mechanisms that will be discussed in the next section, the distortion of the wage structure may actually improve w elfare. This is the well-known theory of the second-best at work. If workers are credit constrained and cannot invest in their general skills, training outcomes are ine cient. Another distortion, in this case in the labor market, may induce the rms to undertake some of these investments, and improve output and welfare.
Proposition 6 Suppose workers are c r edit constrained so that they cannot pay for their training. Then a move from a frictionless labor market to a frictional one can increase surplus.
If labor market frictions did not a ect any other choices, a move from v = f t o wards to v f with v 0 f 0 , i.e. tilting the outside wage function down as in Figure 1 , would increase human capital investments and output. Naturally, in practice, increased frictions will have a n umber of allocative costs, for instance lower employment. These costs need to be compared to the bene ts in terms of better training incentives.
In any case, the implications of labor market frictions on investment are worth bearing in mind when suggesting labor market reforms. For example, the proposal of reducing union power and removing other regulations in the German labor market, which is in the current political agenda, could have unforeseen consequences regarding the German apprenticeship system where employers pay for the general training of their workers.
Shared Investments in General Training
So far we h a ve only analyzed the polar case where the rm chooses the amount of training unilaterally. The justi cation for looking at the investment incentives of the rm was that workers are often credit constrained, therefore cannot bear the costs of training.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to analyze the case in which w orkers are not credit constrained as a useful benchmark. Owing to the labor market frictions, part of the returns will be captured by the rm, so we l o o k a t t h e case of shared investments in which both the rm and the worker contribute to the costs of training. We distinguish two cases: 1 the rm and the worker choose their contributions to training non-cooperatively; 2 they choose the training investments cooperatively. The second case would apply when the rm and the worker could write a binding contract in period 1, specifying the amount of training and the distribution of the costs and perhaps even side-transfers if necessary.
Non-cooperative training investments
In this case, the worker and the rm simultaneously choose the amount o f money they wish to spend on training, respectively, c w and c f . The amount of training is nc such that c nc = c w + c f , o r nc = c ,1 c w + c f : Let us also consider the version of the model with q 0 such that there is turnover. Then the worker will maximize: 1 , q f nc + 1 , v nc + qv nc , c w = v nc + 1 , q f nc , v nc , c w by c hoosing c w 0 and will take c f as given. Intuitively, with probability 1 ,q the worker stays with the rm and in this case his wage is f +1, v : With probability q, he is forced to quit, and receives v . The rst order condition for the workers contribution is: which can be seen to be same as 3. Inspection of equations 4 and 5 immediately implies that both of them will not be satis ed simultaneously. Even if they were, this would not separately pin down c w and c f . The implication is that generically only one of the parties will bear the full cost of training. More precisely, let w be the level of training that satis es 4 as equality, and f be the solution to 5. Then we can state: First note that introducing shared investments does not solve the inefciency of investments. This point will be discussed in more detail in the next subsection. More important is the prediction that despite that fact that training is general, and worker is not credit constrained, the rm may end up paying for all the costs of training. Therefore, for our results that rms pay for general training with little or no contribution from workers to be true, we do not need the workers to be severely credit constrained. It is also interesting to note that the more distorted is the wage structure i.e. lower is v 0 relative t o f 0 , the more likely is the rm to pay for training. Also, somewhat paradoxically, a larger bargaining power for the rm makes it more likely that the rm, rather the worker, will nance the costs of training.
Cooperative T raining Investments
The analysis of non-cooperative i n vestments in training led to some striking results. However, it may be argued that the assumption of non-cooperation" is extreme. In particular, starting from the equilibrium of the non-cooperative game, workers and rms will be able to improve their payo s if they can agree to jointly invest more in training. To analyze these issues, we n o w l o o k a t t h e other extreme where the rm and the worker can write a complete contract over the training level and the modalities of cost sharing in period 1. In this case, the problem in the rst period becomes one of cooperative c hoice or a problem of transferable utility, and the sum of the utility of the worker and the pro t of the rm in period 2 has to be maximized. This means the worker-rm pair maximizes 1 , qf + qv , c
The solution to this problem gives the equilibrium level of training with cooperative cost sharing, but does not inform us on how the costs will be shared. This will depend on the pre-training bargaining, and we d o n o t have m uch t o s a y on this in the current paper. Nevertheless, an interesting conclusion regarding e ciency emerges from this analysis: Proposition 8 If q 0 and f 0 v 0 , then even with cooperative investments and no credit constraints, the rm and the worker will choose a level of training c . I f q = 0 , then c = .
When q = 0, the rm and the worker will produce together, and can internalize all the gains from training. Therefore, the training level they will jointly choose is the same as the rst-best level . In contrast with q 0, the worker and the rm anticipate that they will not be producing together with some probability. Were the case that v f , i.e. competitive labor markets, the return to training would not depend on whether there was a separation or not. However, when v 0 f 0 , the rm and the worker foresee that after a separation the worker will obtain less than f , and they will choose a lower level of training than . Nevertheless, without knowing more about the source of v f , we cannot say whether c is suboptimally low. For example, if the reason why v f is that the future employer of the worker will capture part of the higher productivity due to training, then c will be suboptimally low, because the rm and the worker are creating a positive externality on some future employer. This positive externality is not internalized and c see Acemoglu, 1997 , and Section 3.2 below. However, in contrast, if the reason v f is the fact that the worker has some rm-speci c skills complementary to his general training see Section 3.3 below, c will also be what a social planner would choose, because she would anticipate that with probability q the general skills of the worker will be socially less valuable.
Speci c Mechanisms
The previous section described our general theory of rm sponsored investment in general training. The key ingredient w as a distortion in the wage structure such that f 0 w 0 . We found that the crucial condition to ensure this is f 0 v 0 , that is, outside opportunities for the worker improve less than his productivity when he acquires more skills. Therefore, the shape of the outside wage function in the skill-wage space, v i s o f crucial importance. Even though this is taken as given by the rm and the worker, it is an equilibrium object. In this section, we discuss a number of general equilibrium labor market imperfections which w ould make v distorted and would consequently induce training. Throughout this section, we assume that the worker is severely credit constrained, and cannot pay for any of the training costs. We will only study the rm's incentives to invest in skills. Our aim in this section is to bring out the major ideas rather than to analyze each model fully. F or this reason we h a ve tried to keep the exposition as simple as possible. Although our focus is with mechanisms which ensure rm sponsored general training, for expositional reasons, we will start with a mechanism which does not work.
Imperfect Worker Mobility
Many observers have noted the negative correlation between training and turnover and often concluded that high turnover leads to ine ciently low investment levels Blinder and Krueger, 1996, OECD, 1993 . It is then a simple step to assume that imperfect worker mobility m a y lead to rms to invest in general training. In this subsection, we show that this assertion is not correct. We will use this example as a motivation for the other mechanisms discussed afterwards.
Consider that it costs the worker to switch jobs. Once a worker quits, there is competition among outside rms so that quitters receive their marginal product in their new job f . Therefore, the outside option of the worker is v = f , . Using the Nash bargaining rule as above and setting 0 = 0, this immediately implies w = f , 1 , . So in this case, the rm will make pro ts equal to 1 , irrespective of the level of . Therefore, the rm has no incentive t o i n vest in training despite costly worker mobility. The reason is simple: worker mobility costs do not by themselves distort the wage structure. As is shown in Appendix 5.1, this does not change when we assume that is drawn from a distribution G and the rm does not observe the realization .
Can imperfect worker mobility e v er lead to rm-sponsored investments in worker skills? The answer is only yes if the cost of changing jobs, , depends on , the general skills of the worker. In particular, we w ould need 0 0, thus the cost of changing jobs is higher for a more trained worker. This could be due to the costs of nding new employment, which m a y be less costly for workers with fewer skills. However, such a`technological' reason for why 0 is not a priori convincing. It could also be that more skilled workers nd employment faster and can adapt to new situations better so that 0 0 instead. More compelling reasons for such a di erential will be due to speci c labor market imperfections, and the rest of this section will discuss such mechanisms.
Search and Monopsony
Consider the same set-up as in Section 2, but in the second period the worker has to nd a new rm if he quits the current employer. With probability p, the worker is successful and nds a new rm and with probability 1 , p the worker is unemployed and receives b. 7 If he nds an employer, he has to bargain with this rm to determine wages. Since there is no further period after this, the outside option of the worker in this second bargain is 0. Assuming the same bargaining power, , for the worker as above, he will get a w age w 2 = f and his new rm will capture a proportion 1, of the output. The fact that there is no further period is a special, but nonessential feature. In Appendix 5.2 we analyze the case where this economy has in nite horizon and establish the same result.
The outside option of the worker in the bargain of the rst period is v = p f + 1 , pb. As in Section 2, the condition for the initial employer to invest in worker's general training is f 0 0 v 0 0. This is equivalent to: p f 0 0 f 0 0 6 which will be satis ed if p 1 o r 1. More precisely, when the worker is credit constrained, the level of training will be:
We refer to this situation as search induced monopsony. Because the worker cannot costlessly change employers, the rm has some monopsony power and this makes it possible for it to receive part of the higher output due to worker's higher productivity. Notice how this di ers from the case in Section 3.1, where workers did not have to bargain with their future employers and therefore did not share the rents from training investments. In this subsection, the bargaining over wages with the new employer means that the worker does not receive the full marginal returns to training. The same result is being generated by the possibility of unemployment which has a return unrelated to training. Therefore, in a model where workers receive less then their marginal product from the new employers they nd after leaving their current rm, the outside wage structure is distorted. As a result, the incumbent rm is willing to invest in general skills under relatively weak conditions see Appendix 5.2 and also Acemoglu 1997, for details.
Firm Speci c Human Capital
Our analysis has so far concentrated on general human capital and we argued that a large part of the skills that a worker learns are likely to be of direct use with other employers. However, it is undoubtedly true that there exists skills which are much more useful in the current rm than the outside. Becker's 1964 classic analysis discussed investment in such skills and concluded that the rm should pay for them. Although Becker's analysis once again assumed competitive markets, in the presence of purely speci c skills, markets will not be competitive in the most usual sense of this word. In particular, if a worker has some skills that can only be used in one rm, then for one of the commodities, there is only one buyer and one seller, price-taking behavior does not apply. Therefore, the presence of speci c skills can be thought o f a deviation from perfectly competitive markets, and requires non-competitive analysis. In this subsection we will show that this deviation can also support rm investment in general skills a possibility ignored by Becker and most of the literature which followed him.
Assume that output in the second period is now given as y = f ;s where s is rm speci c human capital. In the rst period the rm again chooses at cost c . The rm speci c skill s of the worker is either acquired during the rst period that the worker spends with the rm for example, via a learning mechanism as in Jovanovic, 1979, so s 0. Alternatively the rm chooses how m uch t o i n vest in these skills with some cost function s such that @f ;0= @ s 0 0 so that the rm would always like t o h a ve some positive amount of rm-speci c skills. Both scenarios are equivalent for the purposes of this section.
Let us also adopt Bertrand competition among outside rms e.g. Felli and Harris, 1996 so that v = f ;0. More generally, e v en if v is not equal to f ;0 it will be independent o f s since this is rm-speci c skills only useful in the current rm. The independence of v o f s is the crucial ingredient in this case.
Assuming Nash Bargaining once more, we h a ve w = f ;s + 1 , f ;0. The rm will then choose: max ;s = f ;s , w ;s , c :
which as before implies that the rm will invest 0 only if 1 and @f0; s =@ v 0 0 or if @f0; s =@ @ f 0; 0=@ . This immediately implies that for rm sponsored investment i n general training we need @ 2 f ;s=@ @s 0, that is a complementarity b e t ween rm-speci c and general skills. In fact, since c 0 0 = 0, it is necessary and su cient for rm-sponsored investments in general training that @ 2 f ;s=@ @s 0 and 1. To summarize, if rm speci c skills and general skills are complements in the production function, the rm would like t o i n vest a positive amount i n the general skills of the workers. If speci c and general skills do not interact, the outside wage function has the same slope in as the production function. Speci c skills generate rents from the current employment relationship, but these rents are the same at all levels of general skill. The rm has therefore no incentive t o i n vest in general skills. If general and speci c skills are complements, increasing general skills raises productivity more than outside wages, enabling the rm to invest in these general skills.
Similar ideas have been discussed in the literature. Feuer, Glick and Desai 1987 analyze the same complementarity w e discussed above, but do not relate it to the resulting distortion in the outside wage structure. Stevens 1994 considers skills which are neither completely general nor completely speci c and notes that this will mean that workers are unlikely to face a perfect outside labor market for these skills. However, she does not consider the interaction between speci c and general skills as a source for rms' investments' in general training. Franz and Soskice 1995 discuss the case where general training is a by-product of speci c training, i.e. the complementarity is on the cost side rather than on the output side as in our analysis above.
The formulation above is also useful to think about other context than merely speci c training. For example, let s denote physical capital of the rm. If rms are heterogeneous in the level of physical capital they have, and physical and general human capital are complements, then rms with more physical capital would like to employ w orkers with more human capital. Suppose there is one rm which has a higher stock o f p h ysical capital than everybody else. It would pay for this rm to invest in the workers human capital if physical capital is not perfectly mobile. This conclusion again crucially depends on the existence of some frictions. With perfect markets, the rm could just sell its physical capital to the new employer if the worker quits, and the worker would receive his full marginal product on the outside market. This is not the case if the capital market is imperfect. At rst sight, this example seems to contradict our general premise that labor market imperfections are needed for rm nancing of investments in general human capital. However, this is not so. If capital is immobile, then the employer has a degree of monopsony p o wer over the human capital of the worker, which i s the source of the distortion in the wage structure. The imperfection in the capital market spills over into the labor market.
Other complementarities will lead to similar results. Bishop 1996 points out that individual skills may be general, but the particular mix of these general skills used by a n y single employer could be rm-speci c. He also discusses network externalities arising from the simultaneous use of a general skill within a team of workers.
Asymmetric Information
Skills may be technically general, but outside employers may be unable to ascertain whether a worker actually possesses these skills or in what amount or quality. If this is the case, the outside wage will not re ect these uncredentialled skills, or not re ect them fully so that f 0 v 0 . This has been suggested by Katz and Ziderman 1990 and analyzed by Chang and Wang 1996. Bishop 1994 nds empirical support for this notion using data from the National Federation of Independent Business Survey. His results show that training programs at previous employers raise the productivity but not the wages of workers. Work experience which is relevant t o w orker's position and easier to observe b y a new employer, on the other hand, raises both productivity and wages.
However, information advantages of the incumbent employers may lead to rm sponsored training even if the skills itself are easily observable. We h a ve analyzed this case in Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, and the following adverse selection model is based on our previous work. 8 Workers have t wo di erent abilities denoted by . A proportion p are low ability and, for simplicity, w e normalize their ability t o = 0. The remaining proportion 1 , p are high ability = 1 . The production function is f ; = , so that a trained worker produces with probability 1 , p and nothing with probability p.
The incumbent rm does not know the ability of a particular worker at the beginning of period 1. At this time, it must decide about training. At the end of period 1 it learns the worker's type and o ers a wage which can be contingent on ability. W orkers quit their original employer whenever the outside wage is higher, v w ;. We also assume that there are other reasons for quits. Even if v w ;, workers will separate for exogenous reasons with probability .
To a void issues of bargaining with asymmetric information, we give all the bargaining power to the incumbent rm by setting = 0. Therefore, a rm will o er a wa g e o f 0 t o l o w ability w orkers. In addition, it would like to o er the lowest possible wage to high ability w orkers. Therefore it will set w ; = v , and lose a fraction of high ability w orkers to turnover. The key ingredient of the model is that the outside market is competitive but cannot distinguish high ability w orkers from the low ability ones. Firms in the second-hand market can observe the training of the worker, but can only o er a single wage to all workers who have a certain amount of training because worker types are private information. Competition will ensure that this wage equals the expected productivity o f a w orker who is in the secondhand labor market. Since some high ability w orkers quit, v 0. This implies that all low ability w orkers will also quit to take advantage of the higher outside wage. In equilibrium, expected output in the outside market and therefore the wage are In words, the rm pays the cost of training for all workers because the type of the worker is not observed before training. After training all low ability and a proportion of high ability w orkers leave, the rm pays the outside wage, v to the remaining workers, and makes pro ts equal to ,v p e r worker. The rst order condition for training is 0 = 1 , 1 , p 1 , v 0 , c 0 = 0 : 7 Since c 0 0 = 0, rms invest in training if and only if v 0 0 1. Since the rm only retains highly skilled workers, f 0 = 1. So this is once more our standard condition for the distortion of the wage structure. It is immediate to see that this condition is always satis ed as v 0 = 1,p= p + 1 , p 1: Intuitively, the presence of low ability w orkers in the second hand market implies that rms view workers in this market as lemons, and therefore are unwilling to pay high wages. More importantly, they do not increase their wage o ers by m uch for workers with high because training is not useful to low ability w orkers who are the majority of those in the second hand market.
Many of the assumptions in this example are inessential and were only made for reasons of exposition. The essential assumption is that training and ability are complements, which w e captured by the multiplicative production function f ; = . T o see the importance of complementarity b e t ween unobserved ability and training, consider instead that f ; = + . The outside wage is in this case
The outside wage increases one for one with in this case, that is v 0 = 1 . Therefore, 7 is satis ed at = 0, and the rm does not invest in the training of its workers. This is due to the fact that training raises the productivity of the more and less able by an equal amount. Asymmetric information still leads to rents for the incumbent rm, but it does not lead to a distortion of the wage structure.
In Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, we present some empirical evidence for adverse selection among German apprentices. We show that apprentices who leave their training rm because of the military draft an exogenous separation earn more than those who stay at the apprenticeship rm and other quitters. Unlike other quitters and workers who stay at the training rm, military quitters are freed from the adverse selection problem, because the reason for their separation is observed by the outside market.
E ciency Wages
There is a class of models where general training paid for by the rm results from the interaction of a labor market imperfection, creating a rent which is independent of skill and would therefore not be su cient for training alone, and a wage oor. One model in this class is the standard e ciency wage model, which w e will discuss rst.
The rm chooses general training in the rst period. In the second period, it chooses what wage to o er to the worker. However, there is a moral hazard problem which requires the rm to pay an`e ciency wage'. The worker can either exert e ort at cost e in which case he is productive or he exerts no e ort in which case he is not productive. If he is productive, he produces f where, as before, is general human capital. If e o r a v ariable highly correlated with e were contractible, then there would be no moral hazard problem. 9 Instead, a worker who exerts no e ort has a probability q of getting caught. We also assume that both the rm and the worker are riskneutral, and there is a limited liability constraint, so that the worker cannot be paid a negative salary. Finally, to simplify the analysis, once more we assume that the rm has all the bargaining power.
These assumptions immediately imply that the worker will receive 0 i f he is caught shirking. This implies the following incentive compatibility constraint for the worker to exert e ort:
w , e 1 , qw: 8 Therefore, the rm trying to minimize costs would choose w = e=q if it can. There is also a participation constraint for the worker to be satis ed. We assume that the participation constraint takes the form w f , where 0 is the amount of output or utility that the worker loses by c hanging jobs, which is independent of skill.
The rm's optimization problem is to maximize pro ts subject to both the incentive and the participation constraints, i.e. To make the problem interesting, suppose that the incentive constraint binds for untrained workers: e=q f0,, meaning either e ort is very important or it is very hard to detect shirking or both. Then the solution adopted by the rm in the absence of incentive problems is not viable. The wage w = f0 , w ould make the worker shirk. So the wage function which satis es both the incentive compatibility and the participation constraints, is: w = max e q ; f , :
The conditions on the cost function for training are not su cient in this case to ensure that the rm hires and trains the worker. However, whenever training costs are low enough that the rm decides to operate at all, it will train its workers. 4. If and f c + e=q then the rm will choose not to operate.
Therefore, once again the rm often nds it pro table to invest in the general human capital of the worker because of the imperfections distorting the wage structure. The incentive problem implies that workers cannot be paid below a certain oor, thus wages for low skill workers are pushed up relative to the wages of more skilled workers. This distorts the wage structure and encourages the rm to invest in skills.
The e ciency wage model we h a ve o ered is special because workers exert the same level of e ort irrespective of their training level, and the outside option is assumed to be f , instead of being explicitly modeled as the option of working for another rm as in, for example, Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984 . But rather than intending to be general, it is meant to show h o w a simple form of moral hazard can also lead to rm sponsored training. If the incentive constraint depends on skill, rms still want t o i n vest in training as long as the constraint is atter than the production function f .
The model by L o e w enstein and Spletzer 1998 has a similar avor. In their model rms can commit ex ante to pay a certain wage in the second period in order to reduce turnover. Whenever this constraint is binding for the rm, the rm has an incentive t o i n vest in the worker's general skills.
Minimum Wages and Other Wage Floors
It is well known that the imposition of a minimum wage can never lead to more training if labor markets are competitive e.g Rosen, 1972 . The intuition for this result is simple: because workers pay for the training through lower wages, a minimum wage may prevent the rm from reducing wages enough during the training period. This is the rationale behind the introduction of training subminima" in many recent state and federal minimum wage laws. Now consider a labor market with frictions, such that those frictions do not lead to training by themselves. As we know, this is the case when the rents collected by the rm are independent of skill, and the wage function is parallel to the production function: w = f , . Such a distortion could be created, for example, by a m o ving cost which is unrelated to skill as in Section 3.1. Suppose that there is a wage oor w M due to either minimum wages or unemployment bene ts which increase the value of unemployment t o workers independently of skill. The rm will invest in training if f0, w M and if the minimum wage is not high enough to make the rm not operate. The intuition for this is simple. Just as in the e ciency wage model, the introduction of a wage oor creates a kink in the wage function w = maxfw M ; f , g : and therefore the crucial condition for a positive training level, a distortion in the structure of wages, is satis ed.
The level of training again depends on where the optimal training level falls relative to the kink in the wage schedule. De ne again as the level of training where the minimum wage ceases to be binding. As in the case of e ciency wages, if ; then the training level chosen by the rm will be = , and if then the rm will set = . Notice the stark contrast of these predictions to the standard human capital model. With competitive markets, a minimum wage just below f0 is most detrimental to the accumulation of general human capital. With frictions, in contrast, such a minimum wage will always raise training nanced by the rm and will never imply that a rm which has operated before will go out of business. A subminimum wage for teenagers, if set below f0 ,, so that it is not binding for the rm will not help to increase training. In addition, a minimum wage w M f 0 will not just eliminate training but will also destroy the employment relationship in the standard model. With frictions, such a minimum wage may o r m a y not force the rm to go out of business. If the rm operates, the minimum wage will induce the rm to invest in training.
A n umber of papers have tried to address whether minimum wages reduce training empirically with somewhat mixed ndings. The early studies by Leighton and Mincer 1981 and Hashimoto 1982 have focused on whether minimum wage laws lead to slower observed wage growth in micro data. Both studies have found this to be the case and concluded that minimum wage laws lead to less training. This evidence on wage growth does not necessarily imply that less training takes place, however. In our model, the introduction of a small minimum wage could lead to a shift on training expenses from workers to rms. Such a shift would be associated with less wage growth after the minimum wage is introduced but this does not imply that the amount of training has to be lower. Card and Krueger 1995 compared cross sectional wage pro les in California before and after the 1988 minimum wage increase with a number of comparison states. They also found atter pro les in California after the minimum wage increase. However, they point out that the California pro le also shifts up and does not cross the previous age-wage pro le. This is not consistent with the standard theory, but it is possible in our model if rms increase training su ciently after the minimum wage increase.
More salient than studies of wage growth are studies which look at the impact of minimum wages on training directly. Leighton and Mincer 1981 use worker reported data on the receipt of training from the Panel Study of Income Dynamic PSID and the NLSY and nd that workers in states with more binding minimum wages receive signi cantly less training. Schiller 1994 nds the same using later data from the NLSY by comparing the training incidence of minimum wage workers with those earning higher wages. This is somewhat less compelling because worker traits which lead to higher pay are typically also associated with more training. Grossberg and Sicilian 1997 use data from the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project EOPP and compare minimum wage workers both to workers earning slightly less and slightly more, ameliorating the problem of worker heterogeneity. They nd insigni cant negative e ects on training for male minimum wage workers and insigni cant positive e ects for women. Leighton and Mincer only analyzed men, although women make up the majority of minimum wage workers. Grossberg and Sicilian also nd lower wage growth for all minimum wage workers. This means that the ndings of slower wage growth do not necessarily imply less training. The Grossberg and Sicilian results are therefore consistent with a theory where rms pay for general training but are not as easily reconciled with the standard model.
Unions
In this subsection we turn to union wage setting. Our previous analyses of bargaining considered individual Nash wage bargains between the rm and the worker. In many situations, especially in Continental Europe, wages are set via union bargaining. We assume that the union can set the entire wage structure w as a function of , training at the beginning of the period and then, the rm chooses training. Thus, this model is an analogue to the standard monopoly union model, except that we replace the rm's labor demand decision with the training decision. In reality, unions may also bargain directly over training practices, and our formal setup ignores this. As will become clear in a moment, this is not really restrictive. In our setup, the union will still take training outcomes into account when it sets the wage. It turns out that there is no di erence for the training outcomes in this case between a monopoly union setup and an e cient bargain.
We assume that the union sets a wage which is greater than the outside wage w v , otherwise all union workers would have an incentive t o leave the unionized rm. The rm maximizes = f , w , c :
We will start with the simple case where the union can only choose one wage for all training levels, and we will then see that the union cannot improve this situation. Suppose we h a ve w = w. The union will anticipate the behavior of the rm which will be in this case to max = f , w , c so that the rst order condition is f 0 = c 0 :
It is immediately o b vious from the fact that the wage does not vary with skill that the rm will choose the e cient training level .
The union simply maximizes the wage income of the worker since the worker is not paying for the costs of training. However, it has to make sure to obey the participation constrained of the rm, i.e. that 0, otherwise the rm will prefer not to hire any w orkers. This implies that the union will set the wage so as to extract all rents and force the rm down to zero pro ts. The optimal wage is w = f , c .
The rm invests in training because f 0 w 0 = 0 . The training investment is e cient, because the union gets a xed payment and the rm is the full residual claimant. This is just the result in Proposition 5. The assumption of the union choosing only one wage rate is stringent if there is some unavoidable heterogeneity among the workers covered by the negotiation of the union. However, in this simple case we h a ve considered, it is clear that the union cannot do better by c hoosing the whole wage schedule, w . In a less stylized model, for example, when there is additional worker heterogeneity, the union will not generally choose a single wage for all training levels. The intuition that training gives the union an incentive to compress the wage structure is quite general, however.
The evidence on the e ects of unions on training for the US is mixed. Studies by Duncan and Sta ord 1980 and Mincer 1983 based on the PSID, Lillard and Tan 1992 based on the CPS, and Barron, Fuess, and Loewenstein 1987 based on the EOPP nd negative e ects of union status on training. Barron, Berger, and Black 1997, on the other hand, report insigni cant union e ects using the EOPP data and nd positive e ects for formal training in the Small Business Administration survey. Lynch 1992 and Veum 1993 also nd positive e ects for formal training in the NLSY. For the UK, Booth 1991 reports more training for union workers and Green 1993 nds more training in small establishments but not in large establishments.
Conclusion
When the wage structure is distorted away from competitive w age structure and in favor of less skilled workers, rms may w ant t o i n vest in the general skills of their employees. This contrasts with the standard theory based on Becker's seminal work where rms would never invest in general skills.
Our approach h a s a n umber of empirical implications. First, our theory predicts that when workers are credit constrained, a more distorted wage structure should lead to more training. In contrast, in Becker's model, because workers are paying for general skills, a more distorted wage structure, by depressing the`skill' premium, should lead to less training. In particular, policies such as minimum wage laws which w ould unequivocally reduce training in competitive labor markets can increase training investments in our world. When workers can pay for their own training, a more distorted wage structure will make it less likely that the training costs are borne by workers.
We view the presence of many rm-sponsored general training programs, such as the German apprenticeship system, and US employers sending their workers to vocational training facilities without reducing their wages much, as evidence that the forces we emphasize are present. Future empirical work to distinguish which speci c mechanisms are important w ould be useful, both to direct theoretical work and the policy debate on training. This is particularly important in order to gauge whether the training levels chosen in a decentralized economy are likely to be suboptimally low, as has been claimed in the literature.
Our work also has implications for the interpretation of empirical results on the returns to training e.g. Lynch, 1992 . The wage returns to training only re ect the total increase in productivity if labor markets are competitive. Our work implies that the true returns will exceed the returns to training measured in terms of the wage, which are often estimated to be quite large already, whenever employers pay for training.
Appendix
Heterogeneity in Mobility Costs
Assume that the mobility cost of a worker is drawn from a distribution G and the rm does not observe the realization . A w orker would now switch rms whenever f , w . Let us also assume that = 0 so that the rm receives all rents from the imperfect mobility o f w orkers. This means that the probability that a given worker quits is given by q = G f , w .
Then, since wage setting power is vested in the rm, given the training level, it maximizes = 1 , q f , w by c hoosing w : Assuming that g , the density o f G exists, this problem has a rst-order condition:
gf , w f , w , 1 , Gf , w = 0:
9
The second-order condition of this maximization problem is satis ed if 1 , G: is log-concave, which w e assume to be the case.
The rm chooses by maximizing: = 1 , q f , w , c where w solves 9. The necessary condition for the rm to invest in training is 0 0 = f 1 , Gf0 , w0 , g f0 , w0 f0 , w0 g f 0 0 , w 0 0 0 where w 0 0 is given from 9. Substituting 9 evaluated at = 0 immediately yields 0 0 = 0, and therefore no training investment. Furthermore, a simple application of the implicit function theorem to 9, assuming that g: is di erentiable, implies that w 0 = f 0 . Thus, an increase in the product of the worker always translates 1-to-1 to the wage that the rm wants to pay the worker. The intuition is the same as in the last section; when the imperfection in question does not distort the wage structure, it does not lead to investment in skills. To illustrate this result, consider the case in which G is uniform on the unit interval. Then some simple algebra establishes that w = f , 1=2, and thus, the rm always chooses = 0 .
A Continuous Time Version of the Search Model
Consider a continuous time in nite horizon version of the model of Section 3.2. Namely, each w orker is matched with a rm, and the rm decides whether and how m uch t o i n vest in the general skills of the worker. The worker has no funds and cannot commit to a lower wage in the future in return for training now. The productivity o f a w orker who receives training is f i n e v ery period. For simplicity, training is only possible in period t = 0. Both rms and workers are risk-neutral and discount the future at the rate r. All worker-rm matches come to end at the exogenous rate q. Also a worker, once unemployed, nds a new rm at the rate p w which i s independent of his training level, and a rm after losing its worker nds a new worker at the rate p f .
Suppose all workers have training and one worker has training , then the value of being employed for this worker as a function of his training level , J E , is:
where J U is the present discounted value of being unemployed for a worker of training . This equation is a standard dynamic programming equation see for instance Pissarides, 1990 . The worker gets w e v ery instant h e is with the rm and loses his job at the ow probability q;in which case he gets J U and loses J E . In turn we h a ve: 1 is necessary is standard. However, the second condition is interesting. First it requires that r 1, t h us the future needs to feature in the calculations. q 1 is also required which means that the worker should not be leaving the rm for sure. Finally, p w 1 is necessary. In fact, p w ! 1 is the case of perfectly competitive labor markets:
the worker nds an employer immediately. Therefore, this last requirement reiterates that labor market imperfections are necessary for rms to invest in the general skills of their workers.
